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Philosophical discussions of disagreement typically focus on cases in which
the disagreeing agents are aware that they are disagreeing and can pinpoint
the proposition that they are disagreeing about. Scientific disagreements
are not, in general, like this. Here we consider several case studies of dis-
agreements that do not concern first-order factual claims about the scientific
domain in question, but rather boil down to disputes regarding methodology.
In such cases, it is often difficult to identify the point of contention in the
dispute. Philosophers of science have a useful role to play in pinpointing
the source of such disagreements, but must resist the temptation to trace
scientific debates to disputes over higher-level philosophical accounts.
1 Disagreement
Here’s a standard set up for philosophical discussions of peer disagreement: “Suppose
that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some
proposition. . . Suppose further that neither of us has any particular advantage over the
other when it comes to assessing considerations of the relevant kind, or that he or she
is more or less reliable about the relevant domain. . . Nevertheless, despite being peers in
these respects, you and I arrive at different views about the question on the basis of our
common evidence.” (Kelly, 2005). Given this setup, philosophers then debate how one
peer should rationally respond to discovering this disagreement. For example, should
she be just as confident in her position as she was prior to discovering the disagreement?
As the quotation makes clear, the philosophical literature on disagreement typically
focuses on cases where, when agents disagree, they are aware that they disagree and
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know what they are disagreeing about. We claim that disagreement in the sciences –
particularly in interdisciplinary contexts – often has neither of these features. That is,
scientists can in fact disagree without really being aware of the disagreement, and even
when it becomes apparent that there is a disagreement, it isn’t always clear (to those
disagreeing) what is actually being disagreed about. Such cases raise novel problems that
have not been considered in the current literature on disagreement. First, we need a way
to account for the lack of transparency regarding the source of the disagreement. Here we
identify one important source of this opacity: disagreements may result from differences
in the background methodological stances of those disagreeing, rather than being about
some fact within the domain being investigated. Such disagreements arise especially
in interactions between scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds, where it is
sometimes difficult to disentangle factual disagreements about the domain being studied
from disagreements about methodology.1 Second, in cases where those disagreeing are
seemingly unable to articulate the source of the dispute, the question arises as to who
would be justified in doing so and as to what methodology would be appropriate. We
argue that philosophers can play such a role, but only if they are careful to resist the
distinctly philosophical temptation to trace scientific debates to disputes over higher-level
explanatory or methodological disagreements, without also considering more pragmatic
factors that can lead individuals with different disciplinary backgrounds to disagree,
miscommunicate, and/or talk past one another.2 Understanding these factors requires
careful attention to case studies, of which we will consider several in detail. Finally,
there is the question of how such disputes are to be resolved.
In what follows, we distinguish between disagreements regarding the facts that fall
within a science’s domain of study and disputes about methodology. But we do not want
to presuppose that methodological disputes cannot also be (or result from) factual ones.
To have a neutral way of talking, we will refer to the facts studied within a domain –
as opposed facts about a field itself or its methods – as “first-order facts”. Philosophers
typically represent first-order facts using propositions, and while such disagreements raise
a host of scientific and epistemological questions, there is little uncertainty regarding the
space of possible resolutions. If two agents disagree about (or assign different credences)
to some proposition P , then the space of possible resolutions is constituted by the set of
ways that the agents might change (or refuse to change) their belief regarding the truth or
probability of P . In contrast, when a scientific dispute does not concern first-order facts
– or where it is at least uncertain which facts are in dispute – it is far from obvious what a
resolution might look like. If, for instance, a dispute concerns which of two frameworks is
appropriate for modeling a phenomenon, there may exist no broader neutral framework
1The cases we consider also diverge from Kelly’s in that it is not clear whether the different parties
can be said to have shared evidence, or the same capacities to reason about the topic or to even
be disagreeing about particular propositions (since the debates are often over methodologies). We
bracket these differences in what follows, since our aim here is not to contribute to the existing debate
over peer disagreement, but to note ways in which scientific disagreement differs from the standard
characterization of disagreement in the literature.
2For further discussion of the important roles philosophers can play in the sciences, see Laplane et al.
(2019); Andersen et al. (2019).
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within which to compare the positions, and there may be no principled way to “split
the difference”. While we here offer no general account of when and how disputes that
do not concern first-order facts can be resolved, the case studies we consider provide
compelling evidence that such disputes are widespread, and make it clear why it can be
hard to see what a resolution might look like.
In claiming that the resolution of scientific disputes is not simply a matter of the
disputants weighing their evidence for their positions, we join a philosophical tradition
going back at least to Kuhn (1962). Kuhn’s emphasis on the role of non-epistemic
values in scientific disputes has recently been more thoroughly explored in the literature
on values in science (see, e.g., Douglas (2009)). While this literature has correctly
emphasized that scientific disputes cannot be reduced to isolated disagreements about
first-order facts, it nevertheless often presupposes transparency regarding the point of
dispute. That is, it presupposes that it is clear what is being disputed, but unclear
what types of evidence are relevant for resolving the dispute. In the cases we consider,
in contrast, there is ambiguity regarding what is being disputed. Additionally, while
disputes over non-epistemic values are one type of dispute that cannot be traced to
disputes about first-order facts, they need not be the only type. While methodological
and disciplinary disputes can in some cases derive from differences in non-epistemic
values, we see little evidence that such differences play an important role in the cases we
consider.
In the epistemological literature on disagreement, Rowbottom (2016) has recently
raised the question of what it means for two agents to disagree. Like Rowbottom, we
are similarly raising a question concerning the range of cases in which agents might be
said to agree or disagree. But his discussion – like the disagreement literature more
generally – is held against a backdrop in which we know the propositions under dispute
and can ask about the agents’ credences towards said propositions. We see our discussion
as providing an independent basis for uncertainty regarding whether certain apparent
disputes count as genuine disagreements.
To summarize: non-factual disagreement is a widespread phenomenon in the sci-
ences, and one that deserves further attention. In this paper we will show that this
phenomenon is widespread, and we will provide some suggestions as to how philosophers
might facilitate better communication among groups of scientists.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the consistency debate in
epidemiology, which we argue results from a difference between the way that theoreti-
cians and experimentalist think about models. This section serves as both a first-order
contribution to the debate about the consistency assumption, and as our first case study
of non-factual disagreement. Section 3 uses the ethnographic research of MacLeod and
Nersessian to highlight similar communication problems among experimentalists and
mathematical modelers in systems biology. Section 4 uses the case study of econophysics
to highlight a distinct but related source of non-factual scientific disputes. Specifically,
different groups of modelers use different kinds of idealizing assumptions. This case study
further expands the range of disciplines where non-factual disagreement is an issue, and
also demonstrates that the phenomenon is not restricted to communication failures be-
tween theorists and experimentalists: different groups of theorists can also get caught
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out by this phenomenon. Section 5 provides a final case study based on Fagan’s work
on different approaches to stem cell biology. Fagan’s work provides an example both
of a failure of scientists to communicate, as well as a philosophical attempt to bridge
this gap. Section 6 takes a step back and considers how philosophers of science can play
a positive role in helping scientists understand and resolve non-factual disagreements.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The consistency debate in epidemiology
We begin with a debate in the epidemiology literature surrounding a modeling assump-
tion called “consistency”. Before delving into this literature, which will be largely unfa-
miliar to philosophers, we will first briefly consider a similar issue that has been raised
by philosophers of science. It is increasingly common to explicate causal claims in terms
of the possibility of changing an effect E via an ideal intervention on its cause C. One
condition of an ideal intervention on C with respect to E is that any influence of the
intervention on E must be via C (Pearl (2009); Woodward (2003)). That is, for an in-
tervention on C to be ideal with respect to E, it cannot influence E by causal pathways
not going through C. As Spirtes and Scheines (2004) emphasize, this condition rules
out “ambiguous manipulations”, for reasons we will presently explain. As we will see,
the problems raised by such manipulations overlap significantly with those arising in the
debate over consistency.
Spirtes and Scheines’ example of an ambiguous manipulation is an intervention
on the variable cholesterol. Will lowering cholesterol reduce the risk of heart disease?
While this seems to be a well-posed question, talk of interventions on cholesterol raises
potential difficulties. There are two types of cholesterol: LDL, which raises the risk of
heart disease, and HDL, which lowers it. If one were to ask about the effects of an
intervention on cholesterol without further specifying whether the intervention changes
cholesterol by changing LDL or HDL (or some determinate mixture thereof), such an
intervention would not be ideal with respect to heart disease. This is because whether the
intervention raises or lowers one’s risk of heart disease depends not merely on the amount
by which it raises one’s cholesterol, but further on what percentage of the increase was
an increase in LDL as opposed to HDL. One can get around this issue by either replacing
the variable cholesterol with the variables LDL or HDL, or by precisely specifying the
intervention so that it is clear how it changes LDL and HDL. But the key point is that
without such moves, talk of interventions on cholesterol – and thus, on these accounts,
of the causal effect of cholesterol – is ambiguous.
In the consistency debate, there is a similar concern about whether variables that
do not allow for unambiguous manipulations can be causally modeled. Yet the modeling
framework in the background is different. The epidemiologists in the debate rely on the
“potential outcomes” framework (Rubin, 1974). In this framework, causes are referred
to as treatments, effects as outcomes, and Y i
x
= y indicates that if individual i in a study
were to receive treatment X = x, she would have the outcome Y = y. The potential
outcome framework is inter-translatable with graphical frameworks more familiar to
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philosophers (Pearl, 2009; Spirtes et al., 2000). A key difference between the approaches
is that while graphical ones determine whether the effect of X on Y is observationally
or experimentally identifiable based on features of the graphical causal representation,
the potential outcomes framework treats potential outcomes such as Y i
x
as undefined
primitives, and provides assumptions under which these quantities can be measured.
Consistency is one of these assumptions, and will be the focus of the present discussion.
A separate (and more widely appreciated) assumption is exchangeability, which when
satisfied, ensures that the relationship between X and Y is unconfounded.3 Here we
will not review exchangeability, but simply flag it to indicate that the issues regarding
consistency have nothing to do with possible confounding.
The consistency assumption originates in Gibbard and Harper’s discussion of coun-
terfactuals (1978). It says that if it is the case that some event C in fact obtains, and
it is also the case that were C to obtain, then E would as well, then E in fact obtains.
In the potential outcomes framework, this is formulated as saying that if individual i in
fact receives treatment X = x, then i’s outcome is Y i
x
– i.e. the outcome i would have
were X to equal x. The consistency assumption links counterfactual claims to what is
in fact observed: Y i
x
= y is understood as a counterfactual claim saying “if i were to
receive treatment X = x then the outcome would be Y = y”, and consistency then says
that if the antecedent is true in the actual world, then the consequent must be true as
well.
While the consistency assumption may seem tautological, it has been a source
of controversy in the epidemiology literature. Cole and Frangakis (2009) argue that
consistency is in fact an empirical assumption, since saying that were individual i to
receive treatment x she would have outcome Y requires that she would have outcome
Y given any version of the treatment. The issue here is the same as in the discussion
of ambiguous manipulations – if there are different versions of the treatment that have
different effects, then the fact that a person was assigned a treatment does not fix her
response to it, even if all other factors are held fixed and the world is deterministic. Since
many treatments will potentially be ambiguous, whether consistency in fact obtains
should be treated as an assumption rather than as a definition or axiom.
In a comment on Cole and Frangakis (2009), VanderWeele (2009) further claims that
consistency can be decomposed into two assumptions. The first is that the counterfactual
relationship Y i
x
is invariant across a range of versions of the treatment. The second is
that the observed value of Y given that i receives one of these versions of the treatment
is in fact Y i
x
. The reason Vanderweele takes the latter to be an assumption is that he sees
the potential outcome Y i
x
as indicating the outcome for when one is assigned treatment
x, and this outcome might not be the same as the one resulting from one voluntarily
choosing to take the treatment. For example, the effect of a job-training course on
employment may differ depending on whether one is forced to take the course or attends
voluntarily. Note that the issue here is not confounding. That is, it is not that the group
of individuals who would volunteer for the course would be causally different from those
3See (Pearl, 2009, section 6.5.3) for the relationship between the notion of exchangeability in the
potential outcomes framework, and de Finetti’s distinct statistical notion.
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who would go only if compelled. Instead, the concern is that even for a single individual,
being forced to take the course might lead to resentment that would make the course
itself less effective (cf. Cartwright (2012), section 8).
In contrast to the epidemiologists just considered, Pearl (2010) argues that we
should treat consistency as a theorem rather than an assumption. Instead of introduc-
ing potential outcomes as undefined primitives whose contents are to be clarified by the
surrounding assumptions, Pearl at the outset defines expressions such as Y i
x
as represent-
ing counterfactuals about what Y would be were X to be x, and gives rules for evaluating
these counterfactuals using causal graphs. Given these rules, consistency follows as a
theorem. So what about alternative versions of the treatment? Pearl’s answer is that if
an action has effects other than via the treatment, these should be specified as part of the
counterfactual. If assigning people to take a course will influence future employment not
merely via course attendance, but also via resentment, then one must take into account
the joint effects of attendance and resentment in evaluating the counterfactual. If, for
example, the resentment resulting from the assignment would nullify any benefit from
the course and result in the individual being unemployed, then it would simply be false
to ignore the resentment and to assert that were the individual to take the course, she
would be employed.
Here we’ve reached a level of abstractness at which it becomes difficult to determine
what, if anything, the parties are disagreeing about. To see what is at stake, it helps
to note why, in the absence of further clarification, each side in the discussion might
initially be inclined to think that the other is saying something false. If one interprets
counterfactuals the way that Pearl does, then the claim that there cannot be causal
counterfactuals about treatments that influence the outcome via multiple avenues sounds
false. It is true that if one accepts the particular counterfactual Y i
x
= y, one cannot also
accept that there is some way that X influences Y such that it might be the case that
X = x, but Y 6= y. But, for Pearl, this is just to say that one should not assert
counterfactuals that one knows not to be true. Once one does accept that Y i
x
= y,
there is no additional assumption needed to establish that there are no problematic
avenues. On the other hand, potential outcomes enthusiasts do not build a logic of
counterfactuals into the notation, so such additional assumptions are required. For
them, when Pearl claims that counterfactual relationships obey consistency, he appears
to be helping himself to knowledge that goes beyond what we would typically be able to
infer from a given experiment.
Of course, Pearl is aware that if one treats potential outcomes as primitives, one
needs to add consistency as an assumption. His position is that it is preferable to not
treat potential outcomes as primitives, but rather to model them using counterfactuals
at the outset, which gets one consistency for free. So what is being disputed here? Upon
inspection, the dispute results from differing perspectives on the relationship between
models and experiments. The tradition of treating potential outcomes as primitives
is motivated by the idea that we can treat the relationship between a treatment and
outcome in a particular experiment as an observed random variable. As such, Y i
x
is
linked to a particular experiment rather than to an invariant relationship in the world
that licenses counterfactuals, and any generalizability beyond that experiment is only
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licensed by additional assumptions. In fact, even in a particular experiment, there can
be ambiguity in how to characterize the treatment.
In contrast, Pearl’s models are not intended to capture particular experiments, but
to represent counterfactual causal relationships among variables. He does not deny that
discovering such relationships can be very difficult. But he sees it as crucial to first have
models and semantics for the relationships that one is trying to discover, and then to
model these difficulties as deviations from the ideal case. In advocating the treatment of
consistency as a theorem, he has in mind a comparison to theorems in geometry such as
the Pythagorean Theorem. Such theorems concern precisely defined ideal objects that
do not exist in the real world. But the use of such objects enables one to explore abstract
geometrical properties “while delegating the task of assessing the practical applicability
of such properties to those who are more intimately familiar with the details of each
specific application” (874).
We suspect that practitioners will not be content to think about their work as
merely that of assessing the applicability of beautiful abstract models. Whether or not
one finds Pearl’s analogy apt, it should be noted that any non-operationalist theory of
measurement will posit some conceptual distinction between the method of measurement
and the quantity being measured. So, from an external philosophical perspective, one
can see the consistency debate as one about how far our theoretical posits can and
should diverge from our measurements. The position of the consistency-is-an-assumption
advocates, if taken to the extreme of saying that we should not represent anything
going beyond the content of our experiments, begins to look like an untenable form of
operationalism. Pearl’s position, when presented in a way that treats thorny and difficult
empirical questions as secondary issues, begins to look like a realism achieved without
the honest toil required to ground it empirically.
Of course, the reason why scientists debate consistency is not because they have
a stake in whether operationalism is correct. In our view, the debate is best seen as
a dispute regarding which of two research strategies is the more fruitful one to pursue.
For Pearl, those who treat consistency as an assumption are ceding their ability to,
in general, look at a causal model and read off its testable implications – for them
whether a model obeys consistency is not built into the counterfactuals themselves,
but must be established on a case-by-case basis. The advantage of Pearl’s approach
is that it gives causal counterfactuals a univocal interpretation across all models, and
it neatly distinguishes the specification of a counterfactual quantity from issues of how
it is to be established. In contrast, for those who advocate treating consistency as an
assumption, Pearl’s proposal that we should treat consistency as a theorem and only
represent counterfactual relationships that obey consistency significantly downplays the
difficulties involved in establishing such counterfactuals based on experiments. Particular
experiments will at best establish a relationship between an outcome and a particular
version of the treatment and thus caution must be exercised in making claims about the
outcome given alternative versions of the treatment.
The sense in which the consistency debate is in fact a debate is that each side
has a difficult time in seeing how the other side’s strategy could work. Both sides see
the other as making the wrong tradeoff between having robust theoretical concepts and
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having concepts that more closely reflect the quantities measured. Here we will not weigh
in on what the appropriate tradeoff should be, or even on whether different tradeoffs
might be more appropriate given different aims. We use this debate to illustrate how
there can be disagreements in science that do not concern first-order scientific facts, but
rather reflect a dispute over strategies. Such disputes are not easily resolvable, and often
reflect sociological divides between disciplines as much as theoretical commitments. Yet
when methodological disputes are not acknowledged, this can lead to scientists within
or across disciplines talking past one another, and consequently taking themselves to
disagree on the first-order facts. Here philosophers of science, who are trained to think
about the logical structure of theories and models, have a potentially useful role to play
in helping scientists avoid such miscommunications.
The debate just considered may seem so esoteric as to be of little practical con-
sequence. Yet the issues that arise dispute between Pearl and the potential outcomes
theorists keep arising as communities preferring each framework approach new prob-
lems. For example, Hernan and VanderWeele (2011) have used the consistency debate
as a launching pad to consider issues of causal generalizability, while Petersen (2011)
has offered a separate approach building on the work of Pearl and Bareinboim (2014).
Moreover, the debate over whether the quantities in causal models should be identified
with particular experiments has implications for whether epidemiologists can model the
effects of a variable such as obesity without specifying a particular way of intervening
on it. What may not be evident from the discussion so far is that there are (at least)
two distinct communities with very closely related frameworks for doing causal inference
in epidemiology, where the differences between the groups are exceedingly subtle, but
still sufficient for preventing them from adopting a joint approach. Of course, simply
diagnosing these debates as tracing back to different views of the relationship between
models and experiments is not sufficient for resolving them. But it does help to clarify
the source of the debate, and is suggestive of what would be required for each side to
address the concerns of the other. Specifically, each side needs to be convinced that the
alternative approach can help them address the theoretical or epistemological problems
they are trying to address.4
The debate just considered involves a fairly high-level discussion between methodol-
ogists interested in spelling out the roles played by certain theoretical principles. If even
methodologists can have disputes in which it is difficult to diagnose the source of the dis-
agreement, it is unsurprising that this will occur among less methodologically-oriented
scientists. Moreover, the example shows that even having the parties to a debate state
their assumptions explicitly is not sufficient for pinpointing the source of the dispute.
Here we’ve suggested that an important but unacknowledged source of the disagreement
is the different perspectives that theoreticians and experimenters take towards formal
models.
4Of course, one possible outcome of such discussions is that the frameworks of each party cannot
address the concerns of the other party. This would not lead to a resolution of the dispute as much
as a dissolution. Each side would use the tools that they need for their purposes, but since they
differ in their purposes there would be no genuine disagreement. Given the similarity of the different
frameworks in the consistency debate, this would be an unfortunate outcome.
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One risk of having two communities that interpret the same models in different
ways is that they may sometimes be falsely led to believe that they are agreeing. That
is, if both communities accept the same models, but read the models as having different
implications, then their apparent agreement regarding the model will mask underlying
disagreement about what can be inferred from it. A more general point is that when
considering communities with different but overlapping methodologies, determining what
the parties agree about can be as difficult as determining what they disagree about.
3 Modelers and experimentalists
The consistency debate exemplifies a more general form of dispute that arises between
theoretical modelers and experimentalists across many areas of science. Theoretical
modelers value models that are precise regarding both the content of the model and the
conditions across which the model can be generalized. In contrast, experimentalists are
constrained by the types of quantities that they can feasibly measure, and are more hes-
itant to represent quantities that are difficult to measure. The experimentalists accuse
the formal modelers of positing relationships that will only obtain under assumptions
that are difficult to establish. The theoreticians deny that they are making any assump-
tions at all, but are merely being precise about the implications of the given models.5 If
one is not justified in accepting the posited causal relationships, they say, one should not
blame the modeling framework, but should instead refuse to accept the posited models.
We suspect that this debate between theoreticians and experimentalists plays out
across a wide range of sciences. This debate has been meticulously documented in
MacLeod and Nersessian’s work on interdisciplinary collaboration. These philosophers
spent time in a systems biology lab in which mathematical modelers attempted to collab-
orate with experimenters, often leading to the frustration of both groups. Reading their
quotations from the interviewees, one can almost hear the irritability in the voices of the
scientists, who cannot understand why the other side won’t just cooperate. MacLeod
(2018) diagnoses the situation as follows:
One problem is that mathematical model-building uses techniques that ab-
stract and simplify biological network information, in order to generate com-
putationally tractable parameter fitting problems. Justifications for these are
based on mathematical and statistical principles. Molecular biologists have
generally no expertise at all in assessing whether these really can produce
adequate representations and are worth investing their time in. (707)
At the same time modelers in the labs we studied underestimated at the
start of their collaborations the amount of tacit, technical and biological
knowledge that goes into experimentation, and the extent to which such
knowledge goes beyond just “recipe following” in experimental procedures.
Particularly they lack understanding of the dependence of those procedures
on sound skills and control, their limitations, as well as technological and
5We also suggest an alternative reading of the theoreticians’ position below.
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material constraints of the biological substances that are used. . . As a result
modelers’ practices are rarely well coordinated with constraints on experi-
mentation. Modelers may build their models in apprehension of experimental
results that are impossible to obtain for technical reasons they do not under-
stand and cannot anticipate. (708)
Here it is salient how the attitudes of the scientists towards the models differ de-
pending on whether they are constrained primarily by mathematical tractability or by
experimental feasibility. The issue is not precisely analogous to that in the consistency
debate, since Pearl was not concerned with tractability. But it similarly shows how
differences can arise between communities that treat modeling as a first step in problem
solving and those that see modeling as much more constrained by experimental practice.
We encourage interested readers to look further at Macleod’s work, which contains
a wealth of examples of the difficulties scientists face in attempting interdisciplinary
collaboration. One difficulty in finding the source of scientific disagreements is that
the written record of disputes across articles may omit sources of disagreement that
only emerge in the face-to-face interactions among the sciences, so ethnographic work is
invaluable. A further virtue of MacLeod’s research is that he does not talk as if simply
highlighting these differences is sufficient for resolving the problems of communication
between different disciplinary communities. The problems he considers can only be
resolved by the cooperation of different communities, and it is a serious worry that the
modeling tools and practices of the communities cannot be straightforwardly combined.
It is far from obvious how to address this worry, or even who would be capable of
developing a path forward, since none of the disciplines considered contains all the tools
necessary for tackling the relevant problems – this is why interdisciplinary collaboration
was called for in the first place. In our discussion, we will also highlight the importance of
not forgetting that scientists in particular disciplinary communities have been trained to
use particular sets of methods to solve particular types of problems, and as a result will
be suspicious of tools from different communities that do not help them solve problems
in their home domain. This point may initially seem too mundane to be worth stating
explicitly. But such pragmatic points are easily forgotten by philosophers as soon as
they are invited to theorize about the conceptual disputes “underlying” a debate.
MacLeod’s discussion also helps us add some nuance to the debate between mod-
elers and experimentalists sketched at the beginning of the section. Echoing Pearl, we
attributed to the theoreticians the position that they were not making assumptions at all
in drawing certain implications from their models, but simply demanding that modelers
be precise. But in the cases that MacLeod discusses, it does appear that the theoreti-
cians are making assumptions, albeit not assumptions about first-order scientific facts in
the domain. Specifically, they are assuming that their mathematical methods produce
reliable results despite making certain idealizations, and, perhaps, that the strength
of the mathematical methods can compensate for limitations in the data.6 Naturally,
experimentalists unfamiliar with these methods will be less confident in the them and
6We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the relevance of this element of MacLeod’s
discussion.
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may be baffled as to how they could work despite such misrepresentations.7 The use of
idealizations can thus serve as a further source of non-factual disagreement. Our next
case study makes this point clear.
4 Econophysics and Idealization
We have seen that the use of idealizations can lead to non-factual disagreements when
different communities diverge in their comfort with idealizing assumptions. A further
context in which idealizations cause difficulties is when different communities disagree
about which idealizing assumptions are appropriate to a particular domain. This is
especially likely to occur in interdisciplinary projects, as we will illustrate with the
example of econophysics.8 This case study offers an interesting contrast to the above,
since it highlights that disputes arise not just between modelers and experimentalists,
but also between groups of theorists with different backgrounds.
Econophysics is the term for a variety of interdisciplinary projects that take mod-
els from physics (typically statistical physics) and apply them to study economic sys-
tems. Thébault et al. (2018) discuss how there has been some debate between econo-
physicists and mainstream economists about the validity of these sorts of approaches.
The economists claim that econophysics models are bad models of economic phenom-
ena, and the econophysicists disagree. But what precisely are they disagreeing about?
As Thébault et al argue, the economists are making an assumption that the standard
modeling methodology in economics is the only way to model economic systems. The
econophysicists – who typically have backgrounds in physics rather than economics –
are assuming that a very different methodology is in play. The disagreement between
the economists and the econophysicists should not be seen as a disagreement about the
validity of the particular model, but as founded in a deep disagreement about which
modeling practices are legitimate. It is not a factual proposition that is at stake, but a
disagreement about whether it is a legitimate kind of explanation of real world phenom-
ena that can be gleaned from the econophysics models that mainstream economists see
as hopelessly unrealistic and flawed.
For example, some econophysics models treat money and exchanges of money in
analogy to energy and the kinetic exchange of energy in gases. They then show that
such systems yield distributional features we see in real world distributions of wealth.
Economists criticize this kind of modeling as being a non-starter, since the exchanges of
money are conservative, meaning that the overall amount of money remains constant.
This model, according to the economists, is just inconsistent with some fundamental
7Feldman (2011) has argued that even in cases where the parties to a dispute do not initially have
shared evidence ”evidence of evidence is evidence”. That is, even if agent A lacks some evidence
E that agent B has, A has evidence (from B) that E exists, and should weigh it accordingly. In
cases where two disciplinary communities rely on methods that render it mysterious to them how
the methods of the other could work, and neither community can provide independent support for
their methods, it seems implausible to suggest that members within each community should treat
the testimony of the other as evidence for some independent evidence in favor of their position.
8Lisciandra and Herfeld (2019) discuss many further examples of interdisciplinary science.
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features of economics that change the overall amount of wealth: growth and credit.
This disagreement is not about some empirical fact, nor even about some economic
stylized fact: it is about what the fundamental governing principles of economic modeling
are. Economics and econophysics have different views on what kind of idealizations are
legitimate; this seems to stem from the methodological backgrounds of the groups. For an
economist, a model of the economy with no growth and no credit is fundamentally flawed,
whereas for an econophysicist, treating money as a conserved quantity is a legitimate
idealization because of the mathematical tools it allows us to bring to bear on the
issue. For an economist, a model of economic agents should treat agents as rational
decision makers whose choices are made consciously and on the basis of the best evidence
available, whereas for an econophysicist, if the focus is on the aggregate behavior then
we can reasonably ignore as much of the fine structure of the individuals as possible.
The econophysics model looks implausible to an economist, since the “agents” essentially
bounce around and exchange money at random. This does not look very much like an
economic process at all. The scale, or the resolution of the model seems to be wrong.
The issue might actually be even deeper than that. Thébault et al (section 5)
present various philosophical understandings of models and modeling and argue that
some fit better than others with the kind of practice that the econophysicists engage in.
Arguably a different philosophical outlook is natural for mainstream economic modeling.
If that is right, then this disagreement really only bottoms out at the level of one’s overall
philosophical view of modeling in the sciences. This is not typically something scientists
spend a great deal of time explicitly thinking about, but rather something they absorb
through their socialization within a certain community of practitioners. As Thébault et
al point out, this is fertile ground for philosophers of science to have an impact within
science: we are trained to analyze methodological foundations, and we can help scientists
who disagree to make clear the nature of their disagreement. However, as we emphasize
in section 6, we should be skeptical of any claim that scientific debates can be traced
back to debates between proponents of different philosophical theories.
The question of when idealizations are justified is a subtle one, and we will not
attempt to resolve it here. Idealization appears to be an essential part of scientific prac-
tice, and the justification of an idealized model need not appeal to the possibility of
replacing it with a de-idealized true model. Rather, it is sometimes possible to prove
that the idealized model does as well as the (unknown) true model for certain predictive
purposes (Fillion and Moir, 2018). But even if some idealized models can ultimately be
given a rigorous justification, at the outset such models are adopted for more pragmatic
aims such as making a problem more tractable. As a result, in cases where two commu-
nities adopting different idealizations interact to address a problem in a new domain, no
one may be able to provide a rigorous proof for whether their idealizations are justified.
This is not to say that the scientists lack any justification for their practices – one would
hope that experienced and methodologically sophisticated modelers will develop a feel
for when certain modeling techniques are promising. But such know-how cannot be
easily shared across scientists trained in different communities. For this reason, disputes
among modelers with different sets of idealizations can be especially difficult to resolve.
So we’ve seen that modelers and experimentalists can disagree on methodology,
12
and we’ve seen that modelers can disagree with different modelers on methodology.
But it’s also true that experimentalists of different kinds can disagree on method as
well. See, for example, Kvakkestad et al. (2007); Rocca and Andersen (2017) for a
discussion of different experimental disciplines apparently disagreeing about the safety
of genetically modified crops, but really disagreeing about details of method.9 This is also
an interesting case because the groups involved – molecular biologists and conventional
plant breeders – are from much “closer” disciplines than the other cases we discuss. So
these sorts of ultimately non-factual disagreement can be quite fine-grained: they can
occur even among nearby disciplines.
5 Dynamical systems theory models in stem cell biology
We turn now to a case study of dynamical systems theory and stem cell biology first
discussed by Melinda Bonnie Fagan (Fagan (2016)). In addition to providing a final
example of non-factual disagreement, Fagan’s discussion also serves as an example of a
philosophical intervention in such a disagreement, and thus will set up our later discus-
sion of how philosophers can play a fruitful role in such debates. This case study also
emphasizes that such non-factual disagreement occurs across the sciences.
Some kinds of cells – known as “stem cells” – have the ability to turn into several
different kinds of other cells. This feature – pluripotency – is of great interest to biologists
since the therapeutic potential of such “programmable” cells is huge. Standard stem cell
biology research typically involves careful experimental study of stem cells. Among the
things biologists are attempting to understand is what genes are involved in causing a
cell to develop into a stem cell, and in the possibility of inducing “stemness” through
manipulation of a cell’s genes. Mapping the “gene regulatory networks” controlling stem
cells is a big part of what stem cell biologists do.
Dynamical systems theory is the mathematical analysis of systems and their behav-
ior over time. DST modelers describe their target system using systems of differential
equations which describe how the variables of interest change in response to changes in
the other variables. Recently, some groups of DST modelers have turned their attention
to modeling stem cells. They have, essentially, found a kind of DST model that exhibits
the classic characteristics of “stemness”; the systems sit in some kind of equilibrium,
but can be made to go towards one of several distinct steady states through some kind
of manipulation. The intuition is that the first equilibrium state is the stem cell state,
and the other steady states are the kinds of cell that the stem cell can be induced to
become.
The DST groups have presented these results as providing an “explanation” of stem
cell behavior. Stem cell biologists have, on the whole, ignored their work. Fagan consid-
ers why the experimentalists have ignored the work of the DST modelers. It will help to
distinguish between two parts of her discussion. First, she imagines some criticisms that
the experimentalists might make against the modelers. Plausibly, she suggests that the
9The case has some downsides compared to the cases discussed above, since there are also institutional
and value-based reasons for disagreement in this case too. But method still plays a role.
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experimentalists might doubt whether the highly idealized DST models in fact apply to
the systems they are studying: they might doubt that the dynamical models developed
by the DST researchers tracks the low-level details of the gene regulatory network, and
they might also question the assumption that the simplistic connection between gene
expression and phenotype presumed in the DST models. Additionally, DST models can
accommodate the known features of stem cells, but they don’t produce new informa-
tion: they haven’t taught us anything surprising about stem cells. Finally, the DST
models focus exclusively on the properties of gene regulatory networks, while ignoring
the cell-level molecular properties that are of interest to experimental biologists.
Second, after presenting these criticisms Fagan claims that the differences between
the experimentalists and the DST models result from the former adopting a mecha-
nistic account of explanation, and the latter adopting a “covering law” account. She
concludes that in order for the DST theorists to convince the experimenters that their
work is valuable, they need to acknowledge the legitimacy of mechanistic explanation
and, presumably, incorporate mechanistic details into their accounts.
While we find it plausible that certain aspects of the debate over stem cell method-
ology can be traced to different views of explanation, Fagan’s emphasis on explanation
potentially obscures more mundane sources of the disagreement. At least some of the
concerns that she imagines the experimenters posing to the theorists reduce to the fol-
lowing: we (the experimenters) do not know why we should think your idealized models
even approximately represent the systems we study, and do not know how adopting
them will help us address the research questions we want to solve. The inability of one
research community to find another research community’s work useful would seem to be
sufficient for them to ignore it. Unless the DST modelers can explain to the experimen-
talists how they would benefit from the models, they will continue to be neglected, even
if the explanatory paradigms of the two disciplines were similar.
In fact, Fagan does suggest a promising way in which mechanistic explanations
might be fruitfully supplemented with dynamical ones (901). She presents Bechtel’s
notion of a “dynamic mechanistic explanation” (Bechtel, 2011), in which one begins with
a mechanistic model of a system and then appeals to dynamical models in order capture
more complex features of the system that elude the mechanistic model. This proposal is
promising precisely because it focuses on a concrete example that the experimentalists
would accept and makes precise the role that the dynamic models are supposed to play.
But we see Fagan as overly emphasizing the role of philosophical theories of explanation
in both understanding and attempting to resolve the debate (or lack thereof). Her
explanation of why mainstream stem cell biologists have been ignoring the DST theorists
strikes us as eminently plausible. To the extent that we have any disagreement with
Fagan, it is only regarding her claim that we can treat the communities’ different views
of explanation as a source of the debate. This does not strike us as plausible, and in any
event, the project of convincing the experimentalists that the DST models will matter
for their work seems largely independent of determining whether the DST theorists rely
on a legitimate alternative account of explanation.
One takeaway from this case study is that “disagreement” doesn’t necessarily mean
an actual dispute among researchers. In this case, the disagreement is really a case of
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one group apparently just ignoring the other. Why don’t the two sides in the consistency
debate or the econophysics debate just ignore one another? Why did those two debates
generate a fractious and disputatious literature, while the DST/stem cell case didn’t? In
the econophysics case, it seems clear that the reason for the vocal dispute is because each
side is trying to lay claim to the same subject matter: modeling economic systems. And
this dispute over territory is obviously going to cause tensions.10 In the DST case, it
seems like the stem cell biologists simply don’t see the DST modelers as doing something
that “steps on their toes” in any way, and so have little reason to resent or object to
their work.
6 Philosophers of Science and Scientific Disagreement
In the previous sections, we have considered a range of cases in which scientists are
involved in a dispute, but where the dispute does not concern the first-order facts from
the relevant domain, and where discovering the source of disagreement takes some work.
Broadly, the disputes considered result from differences in background methodological
assumptions. Resolving these disputes is not merely a matter of one party convincing the
other of the truth of a particular set of propositions, but rather of coming to a consensus
about which modeling frameworks are best suited for making progress in a particular
domain. Yet, it may not initially be clear that the disputes concern methodology rather
than first-order facts. With respect to the consistency debate, one could easily miss
the subtleties concerning the question of whether consistency counts as theorem, axiom,
or assumption, and might instead more directly interpret it as a debate over whether
consistency is true. In the econophysics case, skeptics of econophysics are more likely to
frame their opposition in terms of its simply being false that money is a conserved quan-
tity, rather than granting that it is an idealization and asking when such idealizations
are justified. So the appearance that the participants of a debate are disagreeing about
a particular proposition may be misleading, and this has implications both for what is
involved in diagnosing the sources of the dispute and for suggesting possible resolutions.
In cases where debates non-transparently depend on factors other than the dis-
putants’ beliefs regarding first-order facts, case studies are indispensable. The partici-
pants’ presentations of their debate may not be sufficient for diagnosing the sources of
the dispute, which may only be evident when considering broader methodological and
disciplinary differences. But this is not to say that making a correct diagnosis is merely
a matter of doing more ethnographic work. In analyzing the cases above, we have seen
that many of the disagreements in fact concern questions about the legitimacy of mod-
eling idealizations and of the virtues of particular axiomatizations over others. These
are precisely the types of issues that philosophers of science have been trained to think
about, and where they can make a distinctive contribution in seeking to resolve or make
headway in the relevant debates.
That said, in order for philosophers to play a fruitful role they need to have a clear
picture of the genuine sources of the relevant debate, and here we see philosophers as
10See Mäki and Marchionni (2009) for another case of “scientific imperialism” and resentment.
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having certain tendencies that, left unchecked, can render their advice counterproductive.
Like all the other disciplines considered here, philosophers have a toolkit that they are
primed to use whenever possible, even in situations where the tools are not the most
suitable. In particular, philosophers get especially excited when they can represent
a debate as resulting from a clash of theoretical frameworks, often at the expense of
focusing on more pragmatic sources of the debate.11
In the examples we considered in this paper, we can distinguish between 1) The
reason why the parties are fighting (or ignoring each other) in the first place, and 2)
the methodological reasons that the parties give12 for their disagreement, which often
have a philosophical flavor to them. Examples of the latter are Pearl’s claim that his
approach better approximates the Pythagorean ideal, and DST theorists’ claims that
their opponents are ignoring them because they have too narrow a view of explanation.
Regarding the reasons why the parties are actually fighting, it would be too hasty to
attribute these to pragmatic issues. But it is safe to say that most scientific disputes
do not arise due to the scientists’ commitments to certain philosophical positions about
explanation, abstraction, or metaphysics. Nevertheless, in disputes with their opponents,
scientists will sometimes raise or presuppose methodological principles with philosophical
import. Here is where philosophers have a seemingly helpful role to play in making
headway on the debate, but also where some caution is advised.
Suppose you are a philosopher studying explanation and you are asked to comment
on a debate in which both sides make contentious claims about explanation. You read
through the relevant literature, and discover that the two sides can be divided up so that
their commitments more or less line up with contrasting positions in the explanation
literature. Of course, the scientists, not being philosophers, will be imprecise in how
they frame their explanatory commitments and how they contrast their positions with
one another. So it looks like a perfect opportunity to bring your expertise in order
to help clarify the debate. Herein lies a temptation that should typically be resisted.
The temptation is to think that by clarifying the explanatory claims, one can help make
headway in the relevant debate. The reason that the temptation should be resisted is that
to the extent that the explanatory claims are not causes of the dispute, but rather effects
of it, helping the parties to reinforce their theories of explanation will amount to helping
them shore up the philosophical fortresses from which they are defending their positions,
rather than seeking ways to resolve the debate. If, as we have suggested, certain scientific
debates can be traced to methodological differences regarding which approaches are
successful, then the role of philosophers should be to identify these differences so that
they might be better addressed.
We want to be careful not to oversell the point. Of course, there have been scientific
debates in which explanatory considerations have been central, and even in cases where
they have not been they still may have played a role. Our point is that in order to get
11This practice of tying one’s discussion of a case study in science back to some piece of philosophical
grand theory seems to be an almost necessary part of getting one’s paper published in a philosophy
journal.
12Or perhaps it would be better to say “the methodological reasons that the parties would give if they
thought about it”.
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a clear picture of the debate, one needs to be cautious to avoid the pitfall of placing
too much credence in scientists’ descriptions of the philosophical ideas that are allegedly
at issue. Naturally, this reflects a more general point about learning about scientific
practice from observing it, rather than blindly trusting scientists’ descriptions of what
they do. But scientific disagreements introduce new issues. As we have argued, it
is not always evident what, precisely, scientists are arguing about, and the fact that
they sometimes treat the differences as philosophical provides an especially tempting
invitation for philosophers to intervene. We need to be aware of this temptation, and to
keep it in check, if we are to accurately diagnose the bases for non-factual disputes in
science.
7 Conclusions
In each of the cases we have discussed, scientists from different communities are dis-
agreeing with each other, and the disagreements do not, at bottom, concern first-order
scientific facts. These disagreements often result from broader methodological or founda-
tional differences between the communities. Because these methodological principles are
often tacit, unspoken aspects of the scientists’ training, it is difficult for the practitioners
to recognize the source of their disagreement with their colleagues.
Philosophers of science have the training to recognize the foundation of these sorts
of scientific disagreement and have a role to play in resolving them. But they must be
careful that they act as mediators – helping to facilitate dialogue – rather than giving
scientists tools to reinforce their methodological silos.
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